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Abstract
Sanderson et al’s realist review of strategic purchasing identifies insights from two strands of theory: the 
economics of organisation and inter-organisational relationships. Our findings from a programme of research 
conducted by the RESYST (Resilient and Responsive Health Systems) consortium in seven countries echo 
these results, and add to them the crucial area of organisational capacity to implement complex reforms. We 
identify key areas for policy development. These are the need for: (1) a policy design with clearly delineated 
responsibilities; (2) a task network of organisations to engage in the broad set of functions needed; (3) more 
effective means of engaging with populations; (4) a range of technical and management capacities; and (5) an 
awareness of the multiple agency relationships that are created by the broader financing environment and the 
provider incentives generated by multiple financing flows. 
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The academic literature on strategic purchasing, together with a related literature on contracting of health services, has long adopted principal-agent 
and transaction cost economics as its main theoretical 
underpinning.1 The recent paper by Sanderson et al2 
substantially augments the traditional theoretical perspectives 
on strategic purchasing by adding insights from the literatures 
on the theories of inter-organizational relationships. They 
argue that the economics of organisation brings awareness 
into the “safeguarding” element of strategic purchasers – how 
best to design contractual and extra-contractual arrangements 
to structure interactions among patients, purchasers, 
government and providers, in order to create incentives to 
provide responsive, equitable and efficient care. However, 
the inter-organizational relationships literature helps to 
understand the challenges of coordination and adaptation 
within strategic purchasing relationships, recognizing the 
need for cross-organizational working to achieve value in the 
health system, and also that trust and collaboration are needed. 
Having a strong theoretical grounding is essential, they argue, 
for transfer of policy ideas from one setting to another to be 
informed by a clear understanding of both the mechanism 
that is influencing behaviour, and the context within which 
policies are implemented. In a world where decisionmakers 
at the global and national levels are increasingly looking to 
learn from other countries’ experience, the realist evaluation 
approach, which emphasises the importance of context – 
mechanism – outcome to understand “what works where, 
for whom” is a potentially powerful approach. However, as 
Sanderson et al note, nearly all of the empirical work on which 
they draw to illustrate their theoretical insights is from high 
income settings. 
From its beginnings in the United Kingdom and European 
literature,1 the term strategic purchasing is now firmly lodged 
within the global health policy lexicon: it has been the 
subject of international meetings3 and of major programme 
investment by some donors, for example the Strategic 
Purchasing Africa Resource Centre.4 It also increasingly 
features in national policies in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs), particularly as governments set out to 
develop their strategies to achieve Sustainable Development 
Goal (SDG) 3.8, universal health coverage, providing 
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equitable access to quality health services without risk of 
financial hardship. Strategic purchasing is mentioned in 
national policy documents and plans in places such as Kenya, 
South Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria. This has been a critical 
policy development because up to now, health financing 
policies have primarily focused on resource generation and 
not on how resources are transferred to providers. Failure to 
focus on the key purchasing questions – what services should 
be covered, which providers should deliver them, and how 
should they be paid for – presents a risk that any increased 
coverage or spending will fail to provide the reductions in 
out-of-pocket payments and improved financial protection 
that universal health coverage promises. Further, when 
purchasing arrangements are not intentional about enhancing 
desired health system goals, the quality, efficiency, and equity 
of health systems may be compromised. Strategic purchasing 
provides the critical link between health financing policies 
and health service delivery. But the design and successful 
implementation of this complex policy is a challenge.
RESYST (Resilient and Responsive Health Systems) 
was a research programme consortium funded by the 
UK Department for International Development (https://
resyst.lshtm.ac.uk). From 2010 to 2018, RESYST members 
conducted policy-oriented health systems research on three 
themes – health financing, health workforce, and governance 
and leadership. Strategic purchasing was a key topic area of 
research within the consortium. Like many others working in 
the field, we also adopted an initial analytic framework that 
drew from principal agent theory, seeking to explore the way 
that information, incentives, decision-making authority and 
accountability shaped the relationships between a purchaser 
and the three other key actors they work with – government, 
providers, and the population. Altogether we studied 19 
purchasing mechanisms in 10 countries. These included 
integrated purchaser-provider relationships in tax funded 
systems (for example, the tax funded system in South Africa, 
Nigeria and Tamil Nadu, India), “public contract” models in 
which public funds (either tax or social health insurance) were 
transferred between purchaser and providers in a more arms-
length relationship (such as the Universal Coverage Scheme 
in Thailand, Vietnam Social Security, and the BPJS scheme 
in Indonesia), and “private contract” models in which private 
health insurers purchased services from private providers 
(such as private medical schemes in South Africa and private 
insurers in Kenya).5 For each purchasing mechanism we 
sought to critically assess its performance and identify the 
factors influencing it. 
In setting out to describe and assess the effectiveness of 
the purchasing relationship in these different settings, a first 
barrier that we encountered was a lack of clarity as to what 
activities were involved in strategic purchasing. To fill this gap 
we developed a short policy note6 that elaborated the different 
actions that a strategic purchaser would take in relation to 
government, providers and citizens. Mindful that there is 
often a gap between policies that exist on paper and actual 
implementation, we reviewed written policies and other key 
documents, and conducted key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions to identify where policies existed 
and did not, in relation to these strategic purchasing actions; 
ascertained the extent which these actions were actually taking 
place; and identified factors influencing the implementation 
gaps. 
From looking across this large set of purchasing relationships, 
we found that much purchasing was not strategic, but rather, 
that it remained passive. The formulation of the benefit 
package that was being purchased often failed to take into 
account both cost-effectiveness and citizen preferences, did 
not employ an evidence informed and transparent process, 
and the package itself was loosely described, providing little 
opportunity to obtain value from health spending. The 
selection of providers was often passive: in the case of public 
providers it was difficult, if not impossible, to exclude them 
from the purchasing system even if the quality or value for 
money they offered was low, because of lack of alternative 
providers in rural and remote areas, and because the public 
financial management frameworks did not allow public 
facilities to be excluded from funding arrangements. For 
instance, the Vietnam Social Security fund was obliged to 
provide contracts to all public healthcare facilities based 
on a list approved by the Ministry of Health every year.7 
Contracting arrangements were generally passive, with little 
adoption of more high powered payment mechanisms and 
little use of the purchaser’s power to set quality standards and 
enforce them. Finally, purchasers in most countries had weak 
systems to engage citizens and to be accountable to them. For 
instance, Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
had a complaints and feedback telephone number that was 
not functional in practice making it impossible for citizens to 
place complaints and feedback to the NHIF.8 There were some 
clear exceptions to this – the Universal Coverage scheme in 
Thailand being a notable example9; and many countries 
were beginning to identify ways to incrementally make their 
purchasing arrangements more strategic, for example by 
introducing health technology assessment to inform benefit 
package choices, and planning provider payment reforms 
such as the introduction of capitation in Kenya, Vietnam, and 
Nigeria. 
By providing rich empirical evidence from a wide range of 
LMIC settings, a number of these findings can be framed by 
the theoretical insights of the Sanderson et al review. 
First, the agency theory perspective points to the need 
for a clear policy design, to enable the definition and 
communication of the roles and responsibilities of healthcare 
purchasing actors and shape the mindset of an organisation 
and its staff, so that reforms can be implemented smoothly. 
For example, in Indonesia, when the Social Health Insurance 
scheme was introduced in 2014, the roles of the various actors 
in the system were unclear and there was confusion among 
the central-level public purchaser, the Ministry of Health, 
the District Health Office and local government about who 
would audit and supervise the central level purchaser, who 
would pay primary healthcare providers, who would monitor 
healthcare providers, and to whom public providers were 
accountable.10 
Second, mature strategic purchasing systems drew on a 
broad “task network”11 of agencies and bodies who can take 
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responsibility for activities supporting or strengthening 
purchasing functions. In order to be effective, this expanded 
set organisations need to be carefully coordinated (a relational 
issue) and guided by a clear policy framework (see above). 
In Thailand, for example, health technology assessment to 
inform modification to the benefit package is undertaken 
by the Health Intervention and Technology Assessment 
Programme, the International Health Policy Programme, 
both semi-autonomous research agencies under the Ministry 
of Public Health, and other Thai universities. The Healthcare 
Accreditation Institute accredits public and private healthcare 
providers that are contracted to provide services under the 
Universal Coverage Scheme. Departments at the Ministry 
of Public Health take responsibility for improving service 
quality. The National Health Commission Office supports 
civil society involvement in healthy public policies through 
the mechanism of a health assembly and an annual public 
hearing for National Health Security Office (NHSO). The 
Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth), financed 
by a 2% surcharge on excise tax levied on tobacco and 
alcohol, manages the Health Promotion Fund which supports 
all relevant sectors, public, private and civil society, to carry 
out active health-promoting activities. These additional 
organisations make the environment more complex in terms 
of managing the network relationships, but they also bring in 
a broader range of capacities (see below). 
Third, a common failing of purchasing systems was 
ineffective engagement with citizens and patients. Sanderson 
et al point to theoretical insights from inter-organisational 
relationships theory about trust and interaction as necessary 
underpinnings for such engagement to make healthcare 
systems more responsive to patient needs and preferences. 
This involves both eliciting population health priorities 
(needs and wants) and finding ways to effectively channel 
patient power (through voice or choice) to encourage good 
performance by providers. In most of our study countries, 
the systems for consulting with populations were ad hoc 
and irregular, and there was no clear mechanism to channel 
the information gathered into a process of benefit package 
development. But population awareness of the systems for 
gathering patient feedback was also limited, and the passive 
mechanisms adopted, such as patient feedback boxes, were 
mostly unused. Thailand was again an exception, with both 
robust systems for involving patient interest groups (albeit 
often focused around particular diseases) but also a well-
functioning telephone helpline, aimed at providing guidance 
to scheme members on how to access their entitlements and 
also functioning as a feedback mechanism to receive patient 
complaints. 
One empirical finding which is not directly anticipated 
in either the economics of organisation or the inter-
organisational relationships literatures was the critical 
importance of organisational capacity. Strategic purchasing is 
technically demanding and requires a number of capacities of 
the purchaser. We examined the development of the NHSO 
in Thailand, recognised as an exemplary strategic purchasing 
organisation that was created to administer the Universal 
Coverage Scheme in 2002. Our analysis identified the core 
technical capacities that have enabled the NHSO to manage 
the purchasing function in such a way as to increase access 
to services, provide financial protection, monitor the quality 
of care, assure value for money, protect consumer rights and 
to do this in a sustainable manner. These technical capacities 
are shown in the Figure. Organisational capacity is often 
neglected in the design and implementation of complex 
healthcare reforms, yet has an important influence on their 
success. Greater attention to both aligning reforms with 
capacity, and to developing the capacity of implementing 
organisations to execute these new functions, will be essential 
for the success of purchasing reforms. 
A second area where our work extends the findings of 
Sanderson et al is in relation to the agency relationships 
between purchaser and providers. Most studies of strategic 
purchasing have taken the perspective of the purchaser and 
a single flow of funds; this is exemplified in our own studies 
which describe the benefit package, payment mechanism 
Figure. Capacities Required for a Strategic Purchaser. Abbreviations: DRG, diagnosis-related group; M&E, monitoring and evaluation.
(Source: International Health Policy Programme presentation to RESYST annual meeting, October 5, 2018).
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and contracting arrangements for each individual funding 
flow. However, in practice health financing systems are 
characterised by multiple funding flows, each of which is 
attached to a specific service package, provider payment 
mechanism, and set of reporting requirements. This creates 
a series of parallel, multiple agency relationships that must be 
navigated by the provider. For a healthcare provider operating 
in the context of the fragmented funding environment that is 
typical of LMICs, this means that they may face a number of 
distinct funding flows, each sending different signals about 
what activities they should focus on, and different incentives 
to serve specific population groups or to use resources in a 
certain way. For example, a typical healthcare provider in 
Kenya would receive some funding in the form of a line item 
budget from the county government, capitation payments 
from the NHIF for civil servants, capitation payments from 
the NHIF at a different payment rate for the national scheme, 
case based payments from the NHIF for the Free Maternity 
programme for poor women, user fees from patients, and 
potentially drugs or supplies in kind for vertical programmes 
supported by donors. In this noisy financing environment, it 
is hardly surprising that providers have difficulties prioritising 
and using their resources efficiently. But such arrangements 
are also potentially highly inequitable, leading to differential 
quality of care for different groups, depending who is paying 
for them. This complex agency environment can also facilitate 
opportunistic behaviour by providers. 
Realist review, as conducted by Sanderson et al, is a 
promising approach to integrate theoretical insights with 
empirical observation in order to inform policy transfer. By 
broadening the theoretical framings of strategic purchasing 
to include inter-organisational relations, their paper adds 
new insights into the factors that are likely to influence the 
effectiveness of this complex policy in different settings. Re-
interpreting some of our empirical findings, drawn from 
a variety of settings, along these lines has generated new 
understanding of some of the challenges that our study 
countries were facing. Theories of government capacity would 
provide additional insights which could aid in assessing the 
transferability of such policies across diverse settings. 
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Authors declare that they have no competing interests. 
Authors’ contributions
Conception and design (KH, EB, AH, WP, WP). Analysis and interpretation of 
data (KH, EB, AH, WP, WP). Drafting of the manuscript (KH). Critical revision of 
the manuscript for important intellectual content (EB, AH, WP, WP). Obtaining 
funding (KH). 
Authors’ affiliations
1Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK. 2KEMRI-Wellcome Programme, Nairobi, Kenya. 
3Department of Economics, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan. 4International 
Health Policy Program, Ministry of Public Health, Nonthaburi, Thailand.
Funding
The authors are members of the Consortium for Resilient and Responsive 
Health Systems (RESYST). This article is an output from a project funded by the 
UK Aid from the UK Department for International Development for the benefit of 
developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained 
in the article are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by, Department for 
International Development, which can accept no responsibility for such views or 
information or for any reliance placed on them. Funding for the work described 
in the commentary was also provided by the Asia-Pacific Observatory on Health 
Policies and Systems.
References
1. Figueras J, Robinson R, Jakubowski E, eds. Purchasing to Improve 
Health System Performance. Maidenhead: Open University Press; 
2005.
2. Sanderson J, Lonsdale C, Mannion R. What’s needed to develop 
strategic purchasing in health care? Policy lessons from a realist 
review. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2019;8(1):4-17. doi:10.15171/
ijhpm.2018.93
3. World Health Organization (WHO) Strategic purchasing for 
UHC: Unlocking the potential. Global meeting summary and key 
messages. Geneva: WHO; 2017.
4. https://www.r4d.org/projects/toward-health-strengthening-strategic-
purchasing-expertise-africa/. Accessed March 29, 2019.
5. RESYST. Strategic Purchasing Factsheet. https://resyst.
lshtm.ac.uk/sites/resyst/files/content/attachments/2018-08-22/
Strategic%20purchasing%20factsheet.pdf. Accessed March 29, 
2019. Published 2014.
6. RESYST. What is strategic purchasing for health? https://resyst.
lshtm.ac.uk/sites/resyst/files/content/attachments/2018-08-22/
What%20is%20strategic%20purchasing%20for%20health.pdf. 
Accessed March 29, 2019. Published 2014.
7. RESYST. Strategic Purchasing for Universal Health Coverage: 
A Critical Assessment. Social Health Insurance Fund, 
Vietnam. https://resyst.lshtm.ac.uk/sites/resyst/files/content/
attachments/2018-08-22/Vietnam%20purchasing%20brief.pdf.
Accessed March 29, 2019. Published 2014.
8. Munge K, Mulupi S, Barasa E, Chuma J. A critical analysis of 
purchasing arrangements in Kenya: The case of the National 
Hospital Insurance Fund. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2018;7(3):244-
254. doi:10.15171/IJHPM.2017.81
9. Patcharanarumol W, Panichkriankrai W, Sommanuttaweechai 
A, Hanson K, Wanwong Y, Tangcharoensathien V. Strategic 
purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two 
financing schemes in Thailand. PLoS One. 2018;13(4):e0195179. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0195179
10. Trisnantoro L, Hendrartine J, Susilowati T, Miranti PAD, Aristianti V. 
A critical analysis of selected healthcare purchasing mechanisms in 
Indonesia. In: Honda A, McIntyre D, Hanson K, Tangcharoensathien 
V, eds. Strategic Purchasing in China, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Policies and Systems; 2016. 
11. Grindle MS, Hilderbrand ME. Building sustainable capacity in the 
public sector: What can be done? Public Adm Dev. 1995;15:441-
463.
